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Abstract: The origin of contemporary East Asian economic development coincided with and was to some 
extent caused by the consequences of the Cold War. It was characterized by state-led developmental 
models focusing on import-substituting, export-oriented manufacturing with low labour cost 
competitiveness. States generally designated specific areas in which these activities could take place and 
regulated all aspects of their conduct and the distribution of profits resulting from them. As at least some 
of the states involved have moved towards a post-authoritarian stage of development, the places in which 
industrial development has taken place have broadened in scope and followed private rather than public 
sector priorities. This paper examines this trend and then identifies the principal management challenges 
arising from it. 
 
Keywords: East Asia, industrialization, infrastructure, authoritarianism, industrial geography 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The rise of East Asia to economic ascendancy has taken place since the conclusion of WWII. Fearing that 
Japan might lean towards a Communist revolution, the US authorities opened their markets to Japanese 
exports manufactured in Japanese factories unencumbered with worker’s rights, health and safety issues 
or intellectual property protection. A huge boost to the region was provided by the outbreak of the 
Korean Civil War, which offered opportunities for contracts with local manufacturers in a variety of fields, 
the chance to send troops to the combat zone in return for concessions and the development of recreation 
facilities for US and allied troops in several convenient port locations. Subsequently, the Korean economy 
received a similar boost through its role in the Second Indochina War (or Vietnam War). Manufacturing 
was based on original equipment manufacturer (OEM) products – that is, items with any embedded 
intellectual property belonging to non-national interests and with competitiveness provided by low 
labour costs. In Japan, followed by Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and now China and Vietnam, these low labour 
costs have been managed by moving workers into the manufacturing sector from the large and under-
employed agricultural sector and by suppressing rights of association, collective bargaining and freedom 
of speech. The roots of many an East Asian economic so-called miracle have been refreshed with the 
blood of inconvenient trade unionists. In due course, the success of economic development led to 
generally rising standards of living that eroded low labour cost competitiveness, although some have 
sought to wring the maximum possible value from this asset with force. Eventually the governments of 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan, in particular, have realized that the model no longer has meaningful application 
in their countries and have orchestrated a qualitative change in economic and social structure: to add 
value to production through creativity is benefited by (a sometimes limited form of) democracy, better 
advanced education institutions and social solidarity. Autocrats have been replaced, therefore, and 
occasionally jailed for such crimes as corruption, abuse of power and so forth. Seizure of assets from 
those involved demonstrates that the state will no longer tolerate the methods of the past. It is essential 
to understand why these changes are occurring and what implications they will have for the ways of life 
and patterns of work for citizens across East Asia. Authoritarianism appeared to be invincibly linked to 
East Asian states but is being levered out, unexpectedly, even from such outposts as Burma [Myanmar]. 
The period of authoritarianism had led to a specific form of uneven development that was intended to 
maximize the benefits received by those in hierarchies of power controlling the distribution of resources. 
Post-authoritarian will, therefore, give rise to different but possibly, equally distinctive forms of uneven 
development, no doubt heavily influenced by the differential spread of advanced capitalism across the 
geographical territory explored. In this paper, East Asia is defined as the capitalist countries of northeast 
Asia (i.e. South Korea, Japan and China) and the ten countries of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) (i.e. Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Singapore 
and the Philippines). The temporal focus is from the conclusion of WWII in 1945 until the present time, 
with some recommendations drawn, which relate to future developments. This paper employs the 
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analytical case study method: that is, data has been gathered from a variety of sources and over an 
extended period of time and interrogated using content analysis approaches with a view to providing a 
coherent and systematic understanding of the issues researched. Such an approach can generate accurate 
and useful explanations of events and situations within an analytical framework, which can be used to 
develop understanding in a thorough, rigorous and systematic manner (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
 
2. Authoritarian Development 
 
As the Cold War settled on East Asia, the western world, now led by the USA, permitted both the return of 
the colonial age and the imposition of authoritarian, often military regimes on the countries involved 
under the pretext of fighting Communism. From Korea to Thailand to Indonesia, state violence was used 
against peasants, workers and political opponents in the effort to construct unified, monolithic and 
dedicated anti-Communist regimes. To develop these economies, access was permitted to American 
domestic markets to Asian exporters and the proceeds used in part to create strengthened elite able and 
willing to resist any meaningful form of political change. It has been argued that the period during which 
rapid industrialization took place coincided with a potent and positive cycle of economic growth, which 
cannot be, replicated (Wallerstein, 2010). This argument sees future economic growth based on 
translocation of production to Asian countries as being fatally undermined by the structural crisis of 
reduced profits in the absence of breakthrough new technologies (Balakrishnan, 2009). It is certainly true 
that continued economic growth within the existing development paradigm will continue to place 
extreme pressure on the physical environment and contribute to global climate change (Olson, 2009). 
Aspects of culture within individual states which were considered useful in this form of authoritarian 
developmentalism were promoted as virtuous representations of nationalism and unity, while other less 
valuable aspects were downplayed or demonized (Berger, 2003; Kim, 2010). This is most evident in the 
re-creation of Confucianism as neo-Confucianism and its intimate relationship with the so-called ‘Asian 
values’ propounded by influential leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew and Dr Mahathir Mohamed, not to 
mention leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (Emmerson, 1995; Gong, 1989). It is often concluded 
that the success first of East Asian industrialization as a whole and second of the emergence of specific 
East Asian multinational enterprises (MNEs) as prominent organizations has relied upon a combination 
of state influences and cultural factors (e.g. Chang, 2011; Amsden, 1992; Ward, Pearson and Entrekin, 
1992). Authoritarian development is characterized by state-led economic development based on a 
version of the East Asian Economic Model (EAEM): that is, import-substituting, export-oriented low cost 
manufacturing with competitive advantage based on labour cost suppression. Lewisian movements of 
labour explain structural change within the labour market (Cai and Wang, 2010) and costs have been 
further suppressed by regular uses of force by the state to repress freedom of speech, freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, not to mention the outlawing of political parties that might 
meaningfully represent labour interests at the national or provincial level. International capitalism in the 
modern age has required this of governments in their treatment of labour (Walker, 1999). The 
authoritarian nature of this developmentalism has implications for the spatial arrangement of economic 
activities, which are explored in the next section. 
 
3. Industrial Geography and Spatial Arrangement of Economic Activities 
 
Industrial geography is a field of study that concerns the disposition of industrial facilities and related 
infrastructure in connection with the physical environment of a particular state. A geographical area in 
which industrial activities are deliberately located by the state or by private sector actors may be 
considered an industrial estate (IE). All forms of IE may be incorporated in the concept of the Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ), which is a specified geographic area in which the normal laws of the land are in 
some way varied for specific developmental and economic purposes. Perhaps the most well-known 
examples of SEZ usage is in China when, under the Open Door policy of 1979, a series of SEZs were 
established on the eastern coast and have become the leaders of China’s export-oriented industrial 
growth strategy (Ge, 1999). An IE (or park) is a subset of SEZs and consists of a geographical area in 
which infrastructure and facilities are provided with a view to encouraging investment there. Investors 
aim to achieve lower costs by locating in the IE and may obtain synergies through proximity to other 
firms, which might have complementary resources or competencies. Some IEs are designated as Free 
Trade Zones (FTZs) in which goods may be produced without any taxation or duties imposed upon them. 
Generally, FTZs are aimed at production for export overseas since; otherwise, it would represent a 
significant increase in competitiveness and possibly unfair competition in the domestic market. An FTZ, 
then, is usually also an Export Processing Zone (EPZ), which is an IE in which privileges are offered to 
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production of goods for export. Some EPZs will be FTZs but not all, since benefits might include reduced 
taxation but not zero taxation. From an economics perspective, the benefits of a geographical clustering of 
firms dates to the work of Marshall (1890), who argued that traded interdependencies (e.g. in supplier 
and labour markets) and untraded opportunities (e.g. social interaction and information exchange) act to 
promote competitiveness. In addition, some IEs are designated as technology parks or science parks and, 
in this case, are placed in proximity to universities or other advanced learning institutions. These parks 
are expected to help produce advanced products through the synergies possible from inter-connections 
among firms. In the case where a university is involved, a science park might offer opportunities for 
university faculty to establish their own businesses and might be connected with a business incubator. 
 
IEs are generally located in sites, which have good transportation links both to sources of important 
inputs and to means of exporting. Depending on the type of production, it may be preferable for the 
location to be close to an airport or a seaport. Map Ta Phut IE, for example, largely deals with bulky 
industrial products and so is located on the coast where inputs and outputs can be transported most 
conveniently. In some cases, the IE is located close to a specific resource, which is to be extracted or 
processed. Irrespective of the location, it is expected as a minimum that the IE provides reliable supplies 
of electricity and water. For more advanced IEs, reliable high-speed internet connections will also be 
expected. Many IEs will have their own generating stations in order to guarantee these supplies and will 
maintain private security services. This is particularly important for IEs in countries, which have low 
levels of effective policing and where industrial goods represent valuable items that might be stolen. IEs 
may belong to the private or public sector or a partnership of private and public. Public sector IEs are 
more likely to be aimed at bringing about national developmental goals while private sector IEs are more 
likely to be aimed at making profits. Of course, there may be a considerable degree of overlap between the 
two types. For countries with few resources or technical expertise, it may be advantageous for the host 
government to hire private sector firms from overseas to construct and possibly operate the IE for some 
period on a turnkey or BOT (build-operate-transfer) basis. The Suzhou Industrial Estate in Southern 
China, for example, was built with considerable input from Singapore, where spare capital had 
accumulated and there was a need for additional space and labour, which, according to the theory, could 
be provided by China (e.g. Pereira, 2004). IEs, which attract many factories in labour-intensive sectors, 
which have been common in Thailand, also need to consider accommodation for those workers. Since IEs 
tend not to be close to urban areas with widely available spare accommodation, then dormitories must be 
created for workers and, in some cases, additional family members. Firms will also need to consider 
providing transportation and catering services. Such IEs tend to act as magnets for labour migration, 
since the desirability of jobs varies from province to province, depending on the relative wealth of each 
one. In Thailand, for example, the IE at Lampang has largely drawn workers from the northeastern Isan 
region where incomes are lowest. New jobs can be created by IEs, in other words, that are then taken by 
out-of-town people (Walsh and Anantarangsi, 2009).  
 
The developmental goals that the state can attempt to promote with IEs include both national and 
regional levels. At the regional level, a government can create an IE as a means of increasing employment 
and investment in a depressed area. Japanese manufacturing projects were, for example, encouraged in 
parts of the UK badly affected by the closure of the mining industry (e.g. Morris, 1988). Such efforts need 
not just be reactive responses to depressed conditions but can b e positive efforts to develop competitive 
advantages in an area through promoting positive linkages between organizations and between different 
areas. The opening of bridges and roads better linking Thailand and Laos through the Second and Third 
cross-Mekong bridges in particular has provided firms in cities such as Khon Kaen with much greater 
market opportunities in other Mekong region states, particularly in goods which are comparatively low 
value but bulky and, hence, suitable for road transportation. One effect of the relocation of the Burmese 
capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw has, among other effects, improved the transportation links between 
important economic regions in the country and cross-country border points (Preecharushh, 20090. This 
infrastructure has been built to a considerable extent by Chinese capital, at least partly with a view to 
improving economic co-operation between Burma and China, not least with respect to piping oil and gas 
from offshore Burmese fields to Chinese territory. This improvement in infrastructure is exemplified by 
the development of a new IE project in Dawei (or Tavoy) (Linn, 2010) on the southern coast of the Kra 
isthmus and the site of a historically important port. It remains to be seen what kind of economic 
activities will in fact take place there, to what degree genuine competitive advantages are possible and 
what working conditions are in force for workers in factories in the estate. IE development has not 
reached a final point, since states and non-state institutions continue to try to find new ways of refining 
and improving SEZ projects through improved linkages, training, fostering of new clusters of firms and so 
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forth. The theoretical basis of such developments has been provided by the original work by Porter 
(1998) and the many attempts to expand upon it. The concept is that successful industrial sectors will 
emerge in some specific geographical locations if, for various reasons, the important demand and supply 
conditions are present in or near that area. Hollywood is the obvious example for the film industry. Not 
only is talent drawn to California because of the presence of studios but also there is access to venture 
capital and good physical conditions to make films. In some cases, therefore, it should be possible to 
identify the specific conditions that are required to make a successful industrial cluster and then to create 
one or else encourage other actors to help to provide it. The state of knowledge of their prospects for 
economic success concerning IEs from around the world has become such that authorities as august as 
the World Bank has begun to issue guidelines and lessons from practice (e.g. Zeng, 2010; Farole, 2011). 
 
The ability actually to bring this to pass has yet proved largely elusive, which has given rise to new 
thinking about how to intensify the value created in specific geographical areas. In Southern China, for 
example, this attempt is being led by the Guangdong provincial government, which has been moving to 
create ‘specialised towns’ which focus on creating a high spatial concentration of firms producing one or a 
very small number of items (Barbieri, Di Tommaso and Bonnini, 2010), owing to the increased 
specialization that such actions are known to have produced. In Thailand, a research team led by Porter 
was commissioned by the government to identify a series of potential clusters that would help to take the 
economy beyond the factory age of low wage competitiveness in low value added manufactured 
commodities. This identified areas such as the bio-agricultural sector, fashion and parts of what has 
become known as the knowledge economy. However, the 2006 military coup and subsequent political 
developments, efforts to create these clusters have largely been abandoned. Instead, the EAEM – low 
wages, export-oriented, low value-added manufacturing – has been reinstated as the principal means of 
development. Understanding IEs and their role has, therefore, returned to being a central concern in the 
effort to make the Thai economy more competitive in an international environment in which China and 
Vietnam already pose a significant threat to challenge for inward investment, while neighbouring 
Cambodia has recently entered into its own version of the factory age, with its government agencies 
enthusiastically pointing to the cheapness of its labour as the means of securing its own improved 
economic opportunities (Kunmakara, 2010) and shown themselves willing to take whatever actions are 
required to move inconvenient people out of the way of its developmental infrastructure projects 
(Crispin, 2007). Authoritarian industrial geography differs from economic or rational industrial 
geography in that normal criteria for selecting activities and locations may be set aside in favour of 
political motivations. The decisions that are made require negotiation with private sector partners, in one 
form or another. The relationship between private and public sectors in this regard has varied from 
genuine partnership to force majeure, although the most common arrangement is that private sector 
individuals have been provided with incentives to do as the public sector bids and individuals attached to 
the elites in power may take leadership roles in private sector initiatives to ensure compliance. This is 
explained further in the next section. 
 
4. The Role of Corporations 
 
In the western world, states are broadly divided between those who place the onus for development and 
welfare on the shoulders of the individual, anticipating that small government will enable corporations 
and hence jobs to flourish (Anglo-Saxon model) and those which work in conjunction with the private 
sector to ensure that developmental goals are met by a partnership (European or Scandinavian model). In 
the latter, corporations work with government to provide more or less guaranteed employment; while 
the state ensures that, the employees involved receive the training they need at the state’s expense. When 
it came to East Asia, while states would have preferred to have followed the European model, they lacked 
the resources to do so. Unable to trust corporations to do the right thing for the country of their own 
volition and unable to provide training and development itself, the state made a bargain with the private 
sector: meet developmental goals and the state will turn a blind eye to the methods, while instigating a 
legislative framework and institutional arrangements that would permit corporations to do whatever was 
necessary. In Japan and Korea, therefore, Confucian paternalism created long-term employment contracts 
without which workers could fall rapidly into indigence. Corporations were alternately cajoled and 
bullied into abiding by the social contract into which they had entered with the state. Naturally, those 
corporations took advantage of the latitude offered to them by engineering situations in which, in the 
future, they could ensure that they were free from state controls. Overseas investment in everything from 
industrial estates to bonds to luxury consumer goods placed funds beyond the reach of home state 
governments. In Thailand, for example, the extremely large and diversified Charoen Pokphand 
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Corporation has effectively removed itself from state supervision by moving its locus of control to its 
investments in a Chinese economy now fully embarked on its own East Asian Economic Model. The same 
was achieved to a lesser extent in Singapore and Taiwan, where the state preferred to act through 
government-linked firms, which offered extensive ties and connections between partners that were 
difficult to unravel unilaterally. Now, in the Mekong region in particular, one of the principal dynamic 
features affecting economic growth is the use of overseas Chinese organizations to help bring about 
developmental goals of the Chinese state: e.g., securing long-term, stable access to required resources and 
developing the physical infrastructure that will facilitate the distribution of Chinese goods and services. It 
will be of considerable interest and importance to observe the extent to which these overseas 
corporations will in due course be able to exercise any form of autonomy in their own right or whether 
the central government will continue to exercise its will from afar. 
 
From Authoritarianism to Post-Authoritarianism: The early stages of post-WWII authoritarianism in 
East Asia were accompanied by systematic efforts both to exclude certain classes of people (e.g. peasants 
and workers) from political representation and to establish a pathway to a bourgeois political settlement 
that prevented any meaningful questioning of the capitalist system (e.g. Berger, 2003). This was 
conducted both by local ruling elites, mainly in the military and their allies, in some cases supported by 
US-backed activities. With economies locked in to manufacturing paradigms reliant on access to western 
markets and regulated by the institutions of the Washington Consensus, East Asian people were 
conditioned to internalize the belief that only by continuing in the same vein could not just economic 
progress be made but, also, stability and unity in the country as a whole. However, certain changes 
occurred which meant that a static pattern could not remain in force indefinitely. Not the least of these 
changes was the entry of new states at the bottom rung of the East Asian Economic Model, notably 
Vietnam and China, whose willingness and ability to provide even lower labour costs has provided potent 
competition for existing manufacturer-exporters. Second, such an economy reaches a position, which the 
World Bank has labeled the ‘Middle Income Trap,’ under which it, becomes clear that the means by which 
a low income country can become a middle income country are not the same means by which a middle 
income country can become a high income country. This second phase of progress seems to require a 
greater degree of reliance on the private sector, supported by the state’s enhanced capacity to provide 
infrastructure and a high level of education for labour market entrants, to organize economic activities 
that move beyond the provision of generic manufactured commodities and up the industrial ladder 
towards services and, ultimately, the entry into the information or knowledge-based economy. The most 
obvious example of this is the Republic of Korea, which was at the ceasefire that ended the Civil War in 
1953 one of the very poorest countries in the world but has now become not just a member of the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, membership of which is reserved for the richest 
and most influential of nations, but is one of the most wired societies of all. Its progression beyond the 
Middle Income Trap was accompanied by the relaxations on restrictions on democracy, within the limits 
noted above, construction of advanced infrastructure by the state and state support for industrial 
activities likely to have powerful positive externalities in development of the industry as a whole (Walsh 
and Techavimol, 2009). It is perhaps understandable that other states have hesitated to take this step, 
since powerful elites have grown fearful of losing power, money and status and, as in Thailand, have 
sanctioned violence to prevent meaningful political change. There are some indications that the first steps 
in this change are being taken in China, as the ongoing global economic crisis has begun to force a change 
from exporting manufactured goods to promoting domestic consumption of at least some of those 
products. In the case of China, it is most likely that a pragmatic and unique course of economic 
development and industrial policy will eventuate (Zhengyi, 2009). 
 
Managerial Challenges: Managerial challenges are evident in both the private and public sectors and at a 
variety of different levels. Beginning with the public sector, it is evident that economic activities will take 
place more for the purpose of profit generation and less for meeting national development priorities. It 
may be possible to recoup some financial losses by adjusting the tax regime and to provide certain 
incentives to continue to move companies towards conducting the types of activities required but the 
nature of the relationship between state and corporation will certainly have changed. As cross-border, 
transportation links change the nature of distribution patterns and possibilities in the region, including 
virtual distribution, state agencies will need to develop better relationships with their cross-border 
counterparts and with transnational organizations such as the Asian Development Bank, who lead the 
funding component of such projects. This is likely to require more than just lip service and good manners 
because such organizations tend to be closely allied to agencies that require genuine action, such as the 
ILO and large international non-governmental organizations. More generally, appropriate and detailed 
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plans will be necessary that outline the projected path for the economy and the kinds of skills and 
competencies needed in the jobs expected to be created. It is unlikely to be possible to match supply and 
demand in the future jobs market and predicting wages in such a case is notoriously difficult. However, it 
is possible to make some plans for providing the kinds of incentives that might be effective in persuading 
young people to acquire the desired skills wanted in industry. This planning will also need to consider the 
role of entrepreneurs in subsequent economic development and their involvement with cluster 
development and the industrial geography of the future. As some activities become mobile, even 
hyperactive mobile, the relationship between the hub of an organization and its peripheral places of 
assemblage and production will also need to be renegotiated. Certain core functions of the organization 
will remain place-bound and, for behavioral reasons, the mobility of important, skilled personnel will 
remain limited, finite, and capable of movement only in a certain number of directions. In other words, no 
amount of compensation will induce highly qualified individuals to live in undesirable locations when 
alternatives are open to them. Jurisdiction of operations, not to mention taxation and regulatory 
frameworks in force, are complicated by the nature of cross-border operations and the issues of transfer 
pricing, tax minimization and evasion of workplace safety standards, among others, will again become 
urgent issues. 
 
In terms of the private sector, it is clear that more scope is being provided for selecting the nature of 
economic activities and the spatial location in which they take place. Development in transportation 
infrastructure has not only led to a wider range of locations and alternative options for market 
development. Firms in provincial areas are becoming involved in cross-border grids linking places of 
production and consumption, which may also be cities but need not be (Sassen, 1999). This broadens the 
range of locations, which are attractive from the viewpoint of investment, and the balancing act necessary 
to bring together those skills and competencies and resources required into appropriate spatial proximity 
is assisted to some extent by this broadening. Virtual networks further extend the range of operations 
that are possible. Hence, Singapore-based managers and professionals can work in much of Malaysia and 
Indonesia without having to leave their homes, while labour will no doubt be provided in the lower cost 
islands away from the city-state. Individuals, at least some individuals, will have more scope to choose 
their place of residence and work and to construct employment portfolios in a range of different 
occupations and means of deploying their abilities. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Moving from authoritarianism to post-authoritarianism entails the release of one form of power by elites 
and, presumably, a countervailing grabbing of power and influence in another sphere. Generally, this has 
involved the replacement of military power with beyond the ballot box influence and control of important 
economic assets in one way or another. To some extent, it is necessary to convince these elites (when they 
cannot be removed) to trust that desirable economic activities can take place beyond their immediate 
scrutiny and can be permitted to take place on the discretion of individuals and of uncontrolled 
corporations. This has not taken place in every country in East Asia to date and it is unlikely that it ever 
will, in some cases. However, that is the challenge that remains. The appropriate managerial response 
required to meet changes will depend to some extent on underlying ideology, the degree of democratic 
accountability in force and the configuration of markets and workers in the state concerned. Management 
styles can vary within these confines and according to the specific issue being addressed. For example, 
post-authoritarian uneven development is likely to feature considerable movement of people, mainly but 
not exclusively migrant workers. How is such movement to be managed? What implications are there for 
infrastructure and its development? How are there changes to be funded? Seeking to provide answers to 
these questions will provide a significant space in which management strategies can be implemented, 
monitored and refined. 
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